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We examine a variety of preference-based definitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model.  We first consider the definition proposed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), and show that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800184
If agent`s (subjective) beliefs are ambiguous then the beliefs may not be represented by a unique probability distribution in the standard Bayesian fashion but instead by a set of probabilities. Roughly put, an ambiguity averse decision maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected value that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605029
Das amerikanische Politmagazin Foreign Policy befragte zwischen August und September 2012 insgesamt 62 bekannte US-Ökonomen, worin sie die Hauptursache für die schleppende Erholung des Arbeitsmarkts sehen. Am häufigsten genannt wurde Unsicherheit (31 Prozent). Was ist mit diesem Begriff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291289
Imperfect measurement of uncertainty (deeper uncertainty) in climate sensitivity is introduced in a two-sectoral integrated assessment model (IAM) with endogenous growth, based on an extension of DICE. The household expresses ambiguity aversion and can use robust control via a `shadow ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458085
Knightian uncertainty in climate sensitivity is analyzed in a two sectoral integrated assessment model (IAM), based on an extension of DICE. A representative household that expresses ambiguity aversion uses robust control to identify robust climate policy feedback rules that work well over IPCC...
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I study a dynamic principal agent model in which the effort cost of the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416962