This paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years 'new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD...

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

While WTO disputes involve legal rights and obligations, economics often can help the Appellate Body (AB) make sense of the dispute and the implications of ambiguous language in the Agreements. This paper reviews three examples of where the economics could have provided a clearer basis for the...

In 1984 Congress amended the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, mandating that the ITC ``cumulate'' imports across countries when determining injury. We estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the ITC's...

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

This review provides an overview of the United States' use of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws during the 1980-1994 period. Of particular emphasis in this review is the use of the these laws against Canada and Mexico in comparison with other similar countries. A review of the...

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

This paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years 'new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD...

This paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years "new" users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD...