(5), pages 1114-1144.<P> We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and …-wins andcourt-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from theeconomics of crime literature … conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e.,remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the … conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …

distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 … deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0 …

distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from theeconomics of crime literature. We find the … conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e.,remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying … changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has … strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential …