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Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference doesasymmetric information in bargaining make?
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009
We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning thesize of a pie on proposer behavior in three different … bargaining situations:the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game.Our data show that (a) irrespective of the … information condition, proposergenerosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informedproposers in the ultimatum game try to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866401
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On the Absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory -A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Morone, Andrea; Sandri, Serena; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
absorptionand experimentally test the effects of informing none, some, or all playersabout how to derive equilibrium predictions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866646
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Social Learning of Efficiency Enhancing TradeWith(out) Market Entry Costs - An ExperimentalStudy
Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner; Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007
trades due to information asymmetries.In order to create a potential for social learning, we provide subjects with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866640
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Size matters - when it comes to lies
Eisenkopf, Gerald; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Utikal, Verena - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut <Kreuzlingen> - 2011
A small lie appears trivial but it obviously violates moral commandments. We analyze whetherthe preference for others’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratoryexperiment we compare punishment for different sizes of lies controlling for the resultingeconomic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302673
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On the Acceptance of Apologies
Fischbacher, Urs; Utikal, Verena - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut <Kreuzlingen> - 2010
An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships thathave been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment we find that harmdoers use apologies inparticular if they fear punishment and when their intentions cannot be easily inferred. Afteroffenses with ambiguous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302678
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I want to know:Willingness to pay for unconditional veto power
Gehrig, Thomas; Güth, Werner; Levinsky, Rene; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866695
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Is more information always better? Experimental financial markets with asymmetric information
Huber, Jürgen; Kirchler, Michael; Sutter, Matthias - Universität <Innsbruck> / Sozial- und …; … - 2004
We study the value of information in financial markets by asking whether having more information always leads to higher … returns. We address this question in an experiment where single traders have different information levels about an asset …’s intrinsic value. In our treatments we vary the nature of the information and the trading mechanism. We find that only the very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866871
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The investment game with asymmetric information
Coricelli, Giorgi; Morales, Luis Gonzalez; Mahlstedt, Amelie - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995 … also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback levels increase with the average amountsent. Asymmetric information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866876
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Do Individuals Recognize Cascade Behavior of Others? - An Experimental study
Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
predecessors are observed and regardless of wether additional information is actually revealed by predecessors' are observed and … regardless of wether additional information is actually revealed by predecessors' predictions. Individual price patterns of more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866980
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Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012