When a nonpoint source pollution process involves many polluters, each taking his own contribution to aggregate pollution to be negligible, ambient-based policies become ineffective due to lack of strategic interactions between dischargers. We offer a regulation mechanism for this case. The...

Regulation of nonpoint source pollution often relies in one way or another on policy instruments based on ambient indicators. For well-known reasons, enforcement of ambient-based policies is, at best, limited. If no individual choices or actions are observed, than ambient-based regulation might...

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions...

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective,firms must recognize that their decisions...

The paper inquires whether a public eco-label mitigatesadverse selection, where an ecologically superior (green) product variant is underprovided. A model, integrating entry into a perfectly competitive, vertically differentiated industry and rationally expected quality structure (REQS) under...

The purpose of this paper is to compare the effect of different domestic climate policy instruments under asymmetric information when the regulator wants to secure the survival of a specific firm. It is a well-known result from economic theory that emission taxes lead to a cost-effective...

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights...

We compare taxes and quotas when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about abatement costs. Damages are caused by a stock pollutant. Uncertainty enters multiplicatively, i.e. it affects the slope rather than the intercept of abatement costs. We calibrate the model using cost and...

The paper analyzes international environmental agreements that incorporate transfers from a group of industrialized countries to developing countries in a situation of asymmetric information. The framework of the analysis is a static model of transboundary pollution in which information on...

The paper inquires whether a public eco-label mitigatesadverse selection, where an ecologically superior (green) product variant is underprovided. A model, integrating entry into a perfectly competitive, vertically differentiated industry and rationally expected quality structure (REQS) under...