We had proposed earlier a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and asymmetric information, where agents forecasted prices privately without rational expectations. Consistently, they anticipated idiosyncratic sets of future prices and elected probability laws on these sets,...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately with no model of how they are determined. Therefore, agents face both ‘exogenous uncertainty’ on the future state of nature, and ‘endogenous uncertainty’ on...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately and, therefore, face “exogenous uncertainty”, on the future state of nature, and “endogenous uncertainty” on future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all...

Our earlier papers [2,3,4,5,6] had extended to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory [1,7,10], under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common...

Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...

This paper is concerned with multistage bidding models introduced by De Meyer and Moussa Saley (2002) to analyze the evolution of the price system at finance markets with asymmetric information. The zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information are considered modeling the bidding with...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents, possibly asymetrically informed, face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agent forms private price anticipations on every...

We consider a pure exchange economy, with incomplete financial markets, where agents face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agents forms price anticipations on each spot market,...

In three related papers, we consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents may observe private information signals, form private anticipations and face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium,...