We study optimal policies composed of pollution standards, probabilities of inspection and fines dependant on the degree of noncompliance with the standards, in a context where regulated firms own private information.In contrast with previous literature, we show that optimal policies, being...

The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic...

The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic...

A prevailing view in the literature is that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society....

Recent takeover activity has been characterized by broader participation in acquiror financing on both debt and equity sides. We focus on private equity buyouts, and investigate whether the number of financing participants is related to the likelihood of insider trading prior to the bid...

This paper analyses problems of labor market adjustments to occupational safety and health (OSH) hazards. It also presents analytical models for the eventual measurement and empirical analyses of factors effecting the level of OSH hazards in the workplace. This study does not pretend to deal...

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. In a framework in which potential criminals can choose between different crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead...

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. In a framework in which potential criminals can choose between different crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead...

This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without...

This paper offers a possible explanation for the conflicting empirical results in the literature concerning the relation between loan risk and collateral. Specifically, we posit that different economic characteristics or types of collateral pledges may be associated with the empirical dominance...