We use a mixed market model for analyzing economies with public projects in which the condition of perfect competition is violated. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We show that if large traders are similar to...

An exchange economy with asymmetrically  informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates  the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable  sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different  frameworks are taken into account as regards...

We identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms. Both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...

We propose two generalizations of the Davis Maschler reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

In interim economies with asymmetric information, we show that the coarse core of Wilson (1978) does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated. This failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion...

Ken Arrow (1998) asks, “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” He replies – entirely correctly – that racial “segregation within an industry – that is, firms with either all black or all white labor forces” – may be explained by economic theory, but “the...