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successfully to raise worker wages, income inequality would almost certainly be higher than it is. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415227
We study the effects of mobility costs in a model of wage bargaining between workers and firms, where there is instantaneous matching, free firm entry, heterogeneous labour, and workers' individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired. We derive the employment level and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518874
We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) with the matching-bargaining models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP). Firms and workers form pairwise matches, workers may shirk on the job, and the wage is set in an asymmetric Nash bargain over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330282
We study the effects of mobility costs in a model of wage bargaining between workers and firms, where there is instantaneous matching, free firm entry, heterogeneous labour, and workers' individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired. We derive the employment level and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047949
lower wages and offer fewer non-wage amenities, suggesting that wages and non-wage benefits are complementary. However, we … hired in monopsonistic labor markets face significantly lower wages, both initially and in the long run. These lower wages … are driven by both lower posted wages and reduced bargaining power, as well as reduced opportunities to climb the wage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015163177
This paper presents a neo-Kaleckian-Goodwin model of growth and distribution. The key innovation is the introduction of managerial pay. Kaleckian monopoly power determines the functional distribution of income and Goodwin labor bargaining power determines wage bill division. The model helps...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009672475
We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) with the matching-bargaining models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP). Firms and workers form pairwise matches, workers may shirk on the job, and the wage is set in an asymmetric Nash bargain over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362450
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507203