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domestic production in the first stage and subsequently engage in peace negotiations trying to avoid war. War is costly and war … those involving war. The two players will build more arms in any peace equilibrium than in the (unique) war equilibrium …This paper studies a simple two-stage model of conflict in which two players allocate resources between arms and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014587475
of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where one side can commit to impose surrender on the other …. Under uncertainty on the persistence of claims, long confrontations occur in the unique equilibrium of the game: war arises … both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317128
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637947
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320421
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405864
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956071
bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment, via … coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous changes in equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619