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Coalition formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 2013
models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …This chapter surveys the sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or … coalition, in this chapter, is that of a group which can coordinate agreements among its members, while it interacts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420285
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Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points
Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
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Minimax Regret and Efficient BargainingUnder Uncertainty
Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869345
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Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas - 2011
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307744
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392405
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392414
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Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
Jackson, Matthew O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1997
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338
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Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2010
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
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Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas - Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", … - 2011
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422079
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Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656