Showing 1 - 10 of 302
commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571506
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286976
explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317128
This paper examines the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot … delegation contract. In this model, the time cost of renegotiation prevents a full elimination of the commitment effect of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168992
We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a … renegotiation prevents a full elination of the commitment effect of delegation. Indeed, there are always gains from delegation when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147112
This paper studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the ``pie'' bargained over. I show how this feature can result in an increase of the cost of rejecting an offer for the ``non-harming player''. Beside the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118621
The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749599
an incentive to use cross-commitment devices to reduce the likelihood of spillover welfare losses. The paper also shows … that cross commitment devices that target immediate payoffs dominate cross-commitments that target delayed payoffs. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422534