Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let R^N be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let u^N be a profile of utility functions for R^N. We define the NTU game V_u^N that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its...

Let A be a finite set of m <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 3 alternatives, let N be a finite set of n <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 3 players and let R<SUP>n</SUP> be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Throughout most of the paper the considered voting system is the majority rule. Let u<SUP>N</SUP> be a profile of utility functions for R<SUP>N</SUP>. Using...</sup></sup></sup></font></font>