Showing 1 - 7 of 7
The temporal updating of an agent’s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t , contains a normal belief operator B_t and a non-normal information operator I_t which is analogous to the ‘only knowing’ operator discussed in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620408
We propose a logic based on three modal operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple and transparent axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes'' rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620428
Within the class of structures introduced in [G. Bonanno, Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 144-160] we consider the subclass satisfying the property that, for every state-instant pair (omega,t), there is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620457
In a companion paper we introduced a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency. In this paper we provide an epistemic foundation for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917374
We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008691732
We discuss the issues that arise in modeling the notion of common belief of rationality in epistemic models of dynamic games, in particular at the level of interpretation of strategies. A strategy in a dynamic game is defined as a function that associates with every information set a choice at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826374
This is a slightly extended version of a chapter prepared for the Handbook of Logics for Knowledge and Belief edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joseph Y. Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi, College Publications, London. In [5] (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826380