Low-revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market. These outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending-bid, multiunit auctions. We show that these equilibria are possible under mild...

Each year, multi-stage auctions of one form or another sell or let billions of dollars worth of goods and contracts. Yet despite the significance of such auctions, the existing theory of auctions and competitive bidding fails to explain why a bid taker might prefer a multi-stage auction to a,...

Auctions and bidding models are attracting an ever increasing amount of attention. The Stark and Rothkopf (Stark, R. M., M. H. Rothkopf. 1979. Competitive bidding: a comprehensive bibliography. Oper. Res. 27 (2) 364--390.) bibliography includes approximately 500 works in the area. Additional...

This paper presents an equilibrium explanation for the persistence of naive bidding. Specifically, we consider a common value auction in which a "naive" bidder (who ignores the winner's curse) competes against a fully rational bidder. We show that the naive bidder earns higher equilibrium...

Concurrent auctions of several objects are traditionally analyzed as if they were independent single-object auctions. Such an approximation may be very crude if bidders have budgetary restrictions, capacity constraints, or, in general, have non-linear utility functions. This paper presents a...

We present an example of risk neutral bid-taker and bidders in which the bid-taker obtains a greater expected revenue from auctioning an inefficient contract than from auctioning an efficient contract. This occurs because in going from the efficient contract to an inefficient (but almost...

Reverse auctions are fast becoming the standard for many procurement activities. In the past, the majority of such auctions have been solely price based, but increasingly attributes other than price affect the auction outcome. Specifically, the buyer uses a scoring function to compare bids and...