Consumers have bounded perception and treat similar goods as homogeneous. The interaction between this bias and the structure of firms is studied in a vertically differentiated duopoly with market entry. With fixed costs of quality, natural monopoly and entry deterrence occurs at lower entry...

Local convergence results for adaptive learning of stochastic steady states in nonlinear models are extended to the case where the exogenous observable variables follow a ?nite Markov chain. The stability conditions for the corresponding nonstochastic model and its steady states yield...

There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality do not necessarily refute the aggregate predictions of standard economic models that assume full...

Consumers are assumed to be unable to discriminate between two goods of differing qualities provided that the qualities are close enough. It is shown that in a vertically differentiated duopoly this results in multiple equilibria. Demand for each firm's good is reduced. Firms' profits may be...

This paper examines how a firm can strategically use sellouts to influence beliefs about its good's popularity. A monopolist faces a market of conformist consumers, whose willingness to pay is increasing in their beliefs about aggregate demand. Consumers are broadly rational but have limited...

Loss aversion is one of the most robust findings to have emerged from behavioral economics. Surprisingly little attention, however, has been devoted to nominal loss aversion, the interaction of loss aversion and money illusion. People tend to think of transactions in terms of their nominal...

This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying behavior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking, which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving players' initial responses to games. It is...