not sustainable. We also show that timber certification is negatively related to deforestation and thus seems to be a good …

We investigate the impact of self-organized reputation versus certification by an independent institution on demand for …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification … maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be …

manipulation. We show that certification of private information by a third party may not always be in the interest of the principal … if this certification raises the specter of collusion. …

Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top … down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification …' buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect certification does exist. …

strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in … the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most …-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism. …

This paper provides an economic evaluation of certification and ecolabeling as an important policy instrument for … biodiversity (and environmental friendly) market supply and demand mechanisms; (c) the impact of certification practices in the … certification and ecolabeling policy instruments alone are not sufficient to guarantee a successful creation of markets for …

certification programs increase wealth in male-headed and female-headed households. In male-headed households, standards also change …