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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298

formation games with positive spillovers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977

Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?

Grüning, Christine; Peters, Wolfgang - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 137-158

The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682980

The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

Huang, Chen-Ying; Sjöström, Tomas - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 66-88

We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the … general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682984

Markets and Jungles

Gall, Thomas; Masella, Paolo - Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für … - 2011

Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226355

Autonomous coalitions.

Gonzalez, Stéphane; Grabisch, Michel - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2014

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the …, that is, those present in every maximising collection. We characterize the class of games for which the sets of autonomous … set of games having a unique maximising coalition is dense in the set of games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791258

Income inequality and the progressivity of taxes in a coalition formation model

Barany, Zsofia - Sciences économiques, Sciences Po - 2011

In this paper, I relate the degree of progressivity of the income tax scheme to the prevailing income inequality in the society. I find that, consistent with the data, more unequal societies implement more progressive income tax systems. I build a model of political coalition formation, where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764751

A model of political parties

Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper presents a new model of political parties. I assume that the role of parties is to increase the commitment ability of politicians vis-à-vis the voters. Whereas a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy, the set of policies that a party can commit to is the Pareto set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071543

Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities

Montero, M.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

specific classes of games. However, the results of the two games cannot be ranked in general in terms of efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091237

Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games

Borm, Peter; Ciftci, B.B.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091740

Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games : Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation

Dimitrov, D.A.; Sung, S.C. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092320