We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain …

experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain …

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window …