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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
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Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229
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Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties
Bac, Mehmet; Bag, Parimal Kanti - School of Economics, University of Surrey - 2005
We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent’s corruption by supplementing a costless … overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748057
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Building political collusion: Evidence from procurement auctions
Coviello, Decio; Gagliarducci, Stefano - 2010
We investigate the relationship between the time politicians stay in office and the functioning of public procurement. To this purpose, we collect a data set on the Italian municipal governments and all the procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005. Identification is achieved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269756
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Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstrüwer, Yoan; Robalo, Pedro - 2018
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
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Organised crime, captured politicians, and the allocation of public resources
Di Cataldo, Marco; Mastrorocco, Nicola - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244752
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Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … bureaucrats, generating a trade-off. When the likelihood of corruption is high and competition is weak, collusion may be a price … worth paying to curb corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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Leniency policies and illegal transactions
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005
enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558
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Optimal leniency programs
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608606