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Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy
Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2005
policy, taxes on savings do not form part of the optimal tax mix. When commitment is not possible, the optimal tax scheme …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595907
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Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment
Brett, Craig; Weymark, John Allan - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448775
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Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy
Konrad, Kai A. - 1999
Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the context of time consistent labor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316909
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Globalization and human capital formation
Andersson, Fredrik; Konrad, Kai A. - 2001
This paper compares education investment in closed and open economies without government and with a benevolent government. The fact that the time consistency problem in taxation can make labor mobility beneficial even if governments are fully benevolent - which is known from other contexts - is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339674
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Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation
Ing, Julie - 2016
. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793580
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A theory of threshold contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
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Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation
Ing, Julie - 2016
. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753327
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A Theory of Threshold Contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753246
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an … equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our … results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
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Delegating learning
Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421