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Search, Project Adoption and the Fear of Commitment
Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha - Department of Economics, Sciences économiques - 2013
informed. We study the e§ects of competition on the fear of commitment, and compare the jointly optimal adoption decision to …We examine project adoption decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. Adoption … requires a commitment for a period of uncertain duration, restricting the firm in subsequent periods. Capacity constraints …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011003905
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Project Selection: Commitment and Competition
Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2014
a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, restricting the …rm from selecting another project in subsequent … periods. Due to the capacity constraints and need for commitment, some positive return projects are rejected. In a sequential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011079288
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Project selection : commitment and competition
Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidhartha - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010415497
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Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2001
In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In contrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-integrated downstream firm receives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435014
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Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs
Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2001
In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In contrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-integrated downstream firm receives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260776
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Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs
Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich; Normann, Hans-Theo - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2001
In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In constrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm receives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963690
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Strategic Ex-ante Contracts: Rent-Extraction and Opportunity Costs
Hua, Xinyu - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper considers the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. In a more general setting than previous literature, strategic ex-ante contracts not only extract rent from entrants, but could also mitigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130202
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Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions
Dufwenberg, Martin; Güth, Werner - 1998
, yet similar in the sense that both allow certain kinds of commitment. We show that when the two models are set up in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321706
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Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
Fahn, Matthias - 2020
This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how “direct” performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012269484
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The reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships
Fahn, Matthias - 2020
This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how "direct" performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012662694