Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...

The three notions studied here are Bayesian priors, invariant priors and introspection. A prior for an agent is Bayesian, if it agrees with the agent's posterior beliefs when conditioned on them. A prior is invariant, if it is the average, with respect to itself, of the posterior beliefs....

The type function of an agent, in a type space, associates with each state a probability distribution on the type space. Thus, a type function can be considered as a Markov chain on the state space. A common prior for the space turns out to be a probability distribution which is invariant under...

We observe that the set of all priors of an agent is the convex hull of his types. A prior common to all agents exists, if the sets of the agents' priors have a point in common. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the intersection of several closed convex...