In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The … the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost, we investigate experimentally how players cooperate (collude … implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and …

In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The … the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost, we investigate experimentally how players cooperate (collude … implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. We find that, without communication, players fail to cooperate and …

three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …