This paper analyses comparative statics for first price auctions and all pay auctions with independent private values. In all pay auctions, bidders with low values will respond to a stochastically higher (in the sense of likelihood ratio dominance) distribution of types by playing less...

Monotone ratio orderings are refinements of first order stochastic dominance that allow monotone comparative statics results in games of incomplete information. We develop analogous refinements for second order stochastic dominance based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio...

This paper analyses comparative statics for two classes of n-player games of incomplete information with continuous action spaces. The two classes are defined by differences in the payoff and behaviour of the weakest type: the lowest value bidder or highest cost firm. We show that in ``weakly...

This paper analyses comparative statics for first price auctions and all pay auctions with independent private values. In all pay auctions, bidders with low values will respond to a stochastically higher (in the sense of likelihood ratio dominance) distribution of types by playing less...

A new method is proposed for the analysis of first price and all pay auctions, where bidding functions are written not as functions of values but as functions of the rank or quantile of the bidder’s value in the distribution from which it was drawn. This method gives new results in both...