There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad when there is adverse selection; Using the dual theory of choice under risk, we are able to fully characterize both the competitive and the monopoly market...

The paper develops a theory of the firm’s capital-labor ratio unionization of its labor force. Using explicit game theoretical solutions to union-firm bargaining, it is demonstrated how the firm’s product market power interacts with the inputs allocation rule in such a way that unionism...

In a general equilibrium framework, this paper tries to reproduce an important stylized fact of real economies : firms set prices under demand uncertainty while consumption decisions are taken when prices are already known. Under these conditions, there is place for a quantity rationing...

We build a multi-sector model with wage bargaining and imperfect competition to analyse the links between wage interdependence and competitiveness. Quantity constraints together with union power, firm market power and wage externalities play a significant role in the determination of...

In this paper, we study the optimal payment system for the primary health care market when general practitioners are not only in competition between themselves but also with specialists. We define the copayment to impose in order to ensure a good allocation of patients among the two types of...

Strategic models of product differentiation are applied to the labour market. In a first model we investigate the case of imperfect competition among workers facing an heterogenous labour demand ; the second model illustrates imperfect competition among firms that are heterogenous with respect...

This paper combines the adjustment costs hypothesis of Tobin’s q models with Malinvaud’s proposition that, irreversibility and uncertainty matter in explaining investment. Demand uncertainty and irreversibility allow for excess capacity and lead firms to look at the expected excess capacity...

Wage and price formation are analysed in a general equilibrium model combining wage bargaining, monopolistic competition, stochastic demand, and technological constraints. The alternative implications of "efficient" and "right-to-manage" models of bargaining are studied. The price-cost margin is...

This paper examines the introduction of monopolistic competition into wage bargaining models : in addition to capital-labour substitution, we also consider a cost-push effect. The right-to-manage model requires strong restrictions on the objective functions and leads to problematic conclusions...