This paper shows the robust non existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and...

In spite of fiat money is useless in a standard Arrow-Debreu model, in this paper we will show that this does not hold true anymore when goods are indivisible. In our setting, although fiat money yields no utility, its price will always be positive and the set of equilibrium allocations changes...

Many consumers care about climate change and other externalities associated with their purchases. We analyze the behavior and market effects of such "socially responsible consumers" in three parts. First, we develop a flexible theoretical framework to study competitive equilibria with rational...

We consider a general model of pure exchange economies with consumption externalities. Households may have different consumption sets and each consumption set is described by a function called possibility function. Utility and possibility functions depend on the consumptions of all households....

Asymmetric information concerns either commodities or mutually exclusive states of the world. The notion of competitive equilibrium differs between the two cases. In particular, incentive compatibility constraints are only relevant in the case of asymmetric information concerning mutually...

Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...

In exchange economies where moral hazard affects the distribution of individual risks, we study the viability of linear nonexclusive contracts. It is shown that the linearity in prices and payoffs is compatible with the presence of moral hazard when coupled with a simple participation fee. More...

Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generically the case if commodities are exchanged indirectly, through the exchange of assets, spot markets are inoperative, while the asset market is incomplete. <p> The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non -...</p>

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can be obtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders gets large, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric information on agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents' trades. Convergence always...

В данной статье продолжен анализ рынка опекаемых благ. Автор предлагает свою трактовку проблемы с позиций концепции социодинамики. Дается краткая...