Donors who try to impose policy conditionality on countries receiving their aid commonly face confflicting incentives between using aid to induce income-increasing reforms and using aid to assist low-income countries: this confflict can lead to a time-consistency problem. This paper o¤ers a...

Donors who try to impose policy conditionality on countries receiving their aid commonly face conflicting incentives between using aid to induce income-increasing reforms and using aid to assist low-income countries: this conflict can lead to a time-consistency problem. This paper offers a...

This paper presents a principal-agent model of IMF conditional lending, in the aftermath of a capital-account liquidity crisis. We show that traditional ex-post conditionality can be effective in safeguarding the Funds resources, allowing for the provision of efficient emergency lending and...

Donors who try to impose policy conditionality on countries receiving their aid commonly face conflicting incentives between using aid to induce income-increasing reforms and using aid to assist low-income countries: this conflict can lead to a time-consistency problem.This paper offers a...

This paper presents a principal-agent model of IMF conditional lending, in the aftermath of a "capital-account" liquidity crisis. We show that traditional ex-post conditonality can be effective in safeguarding the Fund's resources, allowing for the provision of efficient emergency lending and...