We study how NAFTA changed the geography of violence in Mexico. We propose that this open border policy increased trafficking profits of Mexican cartels, resulting in violent competition among them. We test this hypothesis by comparing changes in drug-related homicides after NAFTA's introduction...

We study how NAFTA changed the geography of violence in Mexico. We propose that this open border policy increased trafficking profits of Mexican cartels, resulting in violent competition among them. We test this hypothesis by comparing changes in drug-related homicides after NAFTA's introduction...

The Tenth Annual Report published by "Sos Impresa", an Antiracket Association, notices that the organized crime is ah heavy "ballast" in the Southern Italian Economy: "Mafia Business makes annual revenues for 90 mln €, about the 6% ofItalian GDP". This work presents a reading of the organized...

All collaborations can be characterised by power and participation and how those forces are distributed within the group. Action Research’s distinctive feature is that ‘ordinary’ people are actively involved in the entire research process, as they are entrusted with tasks and take on...

The author analyses the reasons behind the appearance of a new type of enterprise - the informational enterprise - and defines its major characteristics. He emphasizes the debureaucratization and deformalization of the organization, the intellectualization of activities and the role of culture...

The author analyses the reasons behind the appearance of a new type of enterprise - the informational enterprise - and defines its major characteristics. He emphasizes the debureaucratization and deformalization of the organization, the intellectualization of activities and the role of culture...

Competition in which goods or rents are allocated as a function of the various efforts expended by players in trying to win these goods or rents is a very common phenomenon. A subset of examples comes from marketing, litigation, relative reward schemes or promotion tournaments in internal labor...

Why is there delay in contests? In this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if...

We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater resources wins. In...

Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this...