In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...

In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015)....

In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015)....

In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satis…es cost monotonicity. We also give characterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal di¤erence between...

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to dene the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satises one form of reduced game consistency.

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost Spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfices cost monotonicity. We also give charqcterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between...

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satises one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency.