Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207810
There has been much controversy over the merits of government regulation to protect growers and franchisees from hold-up at the hands of integrators and franchisors. Typically, economic argument have discouraged regulation, since direct evidence for hold-up is weak and bargaining should yield...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783813
The European Commission proposed to reform the Electricity and Gas Directives to improve access to transmission, increase cross-border capacity, and fully open the electricity and gas markets. The California electricity crisis has weakened support for liberalisation, removed the commitment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783844
This paper analyses the economics of long-term gas contracts under changing institutional conditions, mainly gas sector liberalisation. The paper is motivated by the increasingly tense debate in continental Europe, UK and the US on the security of long-term gas supply. We discuss the main issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647495
In a standard hold-up problem, individuals are vulnerable to hold-up because it is impossible to write complete contracts to cover the lifespan of relationship-specific investments. Hold-up occurs only when investments are to some degree nongeneric, and the extent of the problem increases with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647501
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478564
This paper describes global biodiversity conservation as a co-operative bargaining problem. We model an interdependent ‘technology rich’ North and a ‘gene rich’ South who must co-operate in the biotechnology sector in order to combine their unique and essential resources and maximise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113733
We ask what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power. We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial. In an efficient arbitraged uniform price auction, generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market power. However, if generators...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113830
This paper examines generators’ incentives to exercise market power and the strategies they would follow if all electricity supplies were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modelled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113867