A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) consists of a collection of payoffsets for the subsets of a nite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payof each player must receive. The core of an NTU-game consists of all payoffvectors that are in the payoff set...

The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do...

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in<br/>queuing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is...

This study considers a simple newsvendor situation that consists of n retailers, all selling the same item with common purchasing costs and common selling prices.Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by inventory centralization, which means that they make a joint order...

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations.In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player's cost...

We study transferable utility games with limited cooperation between the agents. The focus is on communication structures where the set of agents forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Agents are...

In the literature, methods for the construction of piecewise linear upper and lower bounds for the approximation of univariate convex functions have been proposed.We study the effect of the use of increasing convex or increasing concave transformations on the approximation of univariate (convex)...

In this paper we study the relation between convexity of TU games and marginal vectors.We show that if specfic marginal vectors are core elements, then the game is convex.We characterize sets of marginal vectors satisfying this property, and we derive the formula for the minimum number of...

In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies.From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games.We show that cooperative oligopoly...

Abstract: A new solution is presented for transferable utility games with graph communication where the cooperation possibilities are represented by a graph. Players are only able to cooperate and obtain some worth in a coalition if they form a connected set in the given graph. To determine the...