This paper addresses the question of whether our evolutionary history suggests that humans are likely to be individually selected selfish maximizers or group selected altruists. It surveys models from the literature of evolutionary biology in which groups are formed and dissolved and where the...

J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as 'low productivity' or high productivity' with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce behavioral...

Game-theoretic models of international cooperation on climate change come to very different results regarding the stability of the grand coalition of all countries, depending on the stability concept used. In particular, the core-stability concept produces an encouraging result that does not...

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce...

We consider the formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model of Young (1993) is applied to a group formation game where voluntary...

We study a dynamic process where agents in a network interact in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The network not only mediates interactions, but also information: agents learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others. Each agent can only...

Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking,...

If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an...