The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear … fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with … concave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy …

The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear … fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with … concave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy …

the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such … games the player set is partitioned into unions and players can only cooperate within their own union. Owen introduced a … value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter extended …

-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games … between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree … centrality and the communication ability of each player. That implies that in unanimity games players that do not generate worth …

We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted …

We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph … solution. Previously this result was only known for multiple partners assignment games, which correspond to the case where G is …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …