In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...

In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue.We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society.We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

In this note we introduce an egalitarian solution, called the dual egalitarian solution, that is the natural counterpart of the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989).We prove, among others, that for a convex game the egalitarian solution coincides with the dual egalitarian solution for...

A competition which is based on the results of (partial) pairwise comparisons can be modelled by means of a directed graph.Given initial weights on the nodes in such digraph competitions, we view the measurement of the importance (i.e., the cardinal ranking) of the nodes as an allocation problem...

In this paper we study endogenous formation of communication networks in situations where the economic possibilities of groups of players can be described by a cooperative game. We concentrate on the in uence that the existence of costs for establishing communication links has on the...

In this paper we study situations where agents who are divided in hierarchical classes have restricted possibilities for communication. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values with weight systems (Kalai and...

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyzethe impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for...

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory...