Different propietats of convex and average convex games are developed in terms of unanimity coordinates. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the core of balanced games containing the Shapley value are given. Connections between convexity and average convexity, the Shapley value, the...

We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all...

Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player...

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the...

This paper presents a characterization of the non-emptiness of the intersection between the imputation set and the Weber set. Tools from non-cooperative zero-sum finite games are used. We assign a matrix game to any cooperative game and the sign of the value of this matrix game is used for the...

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish...

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas five player game with a unique stable set different from the core,...

On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of...