Power indices like those of Shapley and Shubik (1954) or Banzhaf (1965) measure the distribution of power in simple games. This paper points at a deficiency shared by all established indices: players who are inferior in the sense of having to accept (almost) no share of the spoils in return for...

The European integration process can be regarded as an aspect of the overall process of globalization and at the same time as an attempt to reconcile the move towards standardization with the defence of national diversity. A central role in the effort to exploit the benefits of integration...

Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf (absolute and relative) power measures and their interpretations are analysed. Both of them could be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time both of them can be interpreted as probabilities of some decisive position (pivot, swing)...

During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intrainstitutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology...

During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology...