In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequential decision problem. In each step of the process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive...

We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all...

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of...

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the...

Uniform{price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar- kets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only...

A new class of games called Financial games is defined. These games are market games and it is showed that they are a generalization of Bankruptcy games. The algebraic structure of this class of games is studied and necessary conditions for a game to be financial are stated. The proportional...

We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an...

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish...

A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets dened by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payo vectors, called max-payo vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these...