We study the structure of unstable local effectivity functions defined for n players and p alternatives. A stability index based on the notion of cycle is introduced. In the particular case of simple games, the stability index is closely related to the Nakamura Number. In general it may be any...

An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if...

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...

Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey than a systematic exposition, in an unifying framework and assuming convexity as well on the consumption side as on the production side, of the different equilibrium concepts elaborated for studying provision of public...

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are...

We consider TU-games with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. In such a situation, the core may be unbounded, and one has to select a bounded part of the core as a solution concept. The...

The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff...

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...

In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many...

Suppose a decision maker (DM) has partial information about certain events of a ?-algebra A belonging to set ? and assesses their likelihood through a capacity v. When is this information probabilistic, i.e. compatible with a probability ? We consider three notions of compatibility with a...