We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect corporate risk-taking. Using hand-collected data on French publicly-listed companies over the period 2003-2007, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS, other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), are...

Evidence based on US firms suggests that large boards restrain risk taking. We investigate whether a similar effect exists in Japan. Our results confirm that firms with larger boards exhibit lower performance variability relative to firms with smaller boards. However, this effect is less...

Event studies indicate that divestitures create shareholder value. However, managers are generally disinclined to execute a divestiture due to their inherent preferences for growing the firm’s assets. Governance structures can play a significant role in restraining this agency conflict. Using...

Event studies indicate that divestitures create shareholder value. However, managers are generally disinclined to execute a divestiture due to their inherent preferences for growing the firm’s assets. Governance structures can play a significant role in restraining this agency conflict....