We exploit a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on diversity of citizenship in legal disputes to estimate the contribution of the court system to firm value. In an event study, we find that an increase in state court quality from bottom to top tercile is associated with an average increase in equity...

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to measure agency conflicts for a large panel of 12,652 firms from 14 countries. Our estimates show that agency conflicts are large and vary significantly across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in...

The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of ultimate owners' control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, and the different...

Respecting the importance of corporate governance (CG), particularly various corporate governance mechanisms for improving corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, the paper highlights relevant CG-CSR synergies from the perspective of systems thinking. The paper further aims to...

Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...

This short technical report provides an empirical analysis of the level of institutional block ownership overall, and of foreign block ownership, at a broad set of publicly traded corporations. Disclosed institutional blockholders of every company in the Standard & Poor's 500 index are analyzed,...

International evidence has shown how the lack of proper corporate governance in banks increases risk management, thereby reducing their financial strength. This paper addresses how corporate governance in Peruvian banks is related to their financial strength. The measure of corporate governance...

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...