Using the most recent available data on a sample of 40 developing countries, this paper addresses the effects of oil rent on inequality. Mobilizing a dynamic panel data specification over the period 1996–2008, the econometric results yield two important findings. First, there is a non-linear...

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the...

Preshipment inspection programs are implemented in many developing countries to fight customs corruption. They consist in delegating the inspection of imports to a private firm that operates in the exporting country. To study those PSI programs, we develop a hierarchical agency model where the...

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between corruption and public revenues. An empirical investigation of panel data (125 countries and covering the period 1980-2002) makes it possible not to reject the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on public revenues collection....

In this paper, we examine the microeconomic determinants of the perception of corruption in twelve Sub-Saharan African countries. Unlike the indicators of corruption based on the opinion of international experts, the study focuses on corrupt practices as experienced by the African people...

In this paper, we analyze the interaction between corruption, taxation and economic growth. Our contributions are twofold. Theoretically, in an endogenous growth model, we introduce corruption in two different ways: corruption in the public expenditure and corruption in the public revenue. We...

The aim of this paper was to re-examine the relationship between the quality of public institutions and corruption. Estimations from generalized method of moments show that better public institutions (regulation, bureaucracy, political structures) are associated with lower levels of corruption.