Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of...

The paper is dealing with the credit support to the Czech agriculture provided by Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF) during the ten years period since the inception of its activities in 1994 do the year 2003 which preceded to the Czech entry into European Union (EU)...

A model of international banking, with the stress on the specific management human capital (borrower monitoring) and the majority shareholder human capital (manager auditing) is used to study the effects of exogenous shocks in one country on credit creation in the other. I show that the presence...

Provision of credit guarantees or subsidies may remove an adverse selection leading to credit rationing. This paper concentrates on comparison of government budget costs of credit guarantees and subsidies in a monopolistic credit market. Di?erent opportunity costs among entrepreneurs, which...

This paper provides a critical survey of some recent developments in the principal-agent approach to the relationship between lenders and borrowers. The costly state verification model of optimal debt contract is introduced and new results with respect to optimality of standard debt contracts in...