Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010415541
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010415550
This paper contributes to the literature on private law enforcement by proposing a novel solution to the problem of underenforcement by monopolistic enforcers. Monopolistic enforcers underinvest in fine collection because, by maximizing net expected revenue, they ignore the social benefits of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008623521
Until the seventeenth century, the Ottomans used fines extensively for law enforcement and employed agents to collect the fines. Fines can be costly to implement because of agency problems and corruption. To solve the problem of corruption, the Ottomans implemented a variety of mechanisms,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321720
This paper incorporates the reality that the bulk of law enforcement is decentralized while sanctions are chosen centrally, and explores the implications for the socially optimal sanction level. The presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010944628
The literature on frivolous lawsuits has focused on litigation costs and the optimal settlement-trial decision of defendants, but has not examined how they affect the decisions of potential injurers. This paper asks whether there are circumstances under which frivolous suits might actually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888345
This paper explores the advantages of focusing law enforcement on some locations when offenders can choose locations. The substitutability of different crimes from the offender's perspective is established as the key variable determining whether asymmetric enforcement is socially desirable. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888386
Previous literature on frivolous lawsuits has focused on litigation costs and the optimal settlement-trial decision of defendants, but has not examined how they affect deterrence. This paper examines whether there are circumstances under which frivolous suits might actually increase deterrence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011079303
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751168