Public schemes for sickness benefits and disability insurance are often criticized for the lack of incentive they provide for preventive and reintegration activities by employers. To stimulate the interest of employers in engaging with these schemes, several modes of privatization could be...

Variation in assessor stringency in awarding benefits leaves applicants exposed to uninsured risk that could be systematic if discretion were exercised selectively. We test for this using administrative data on applications to the Dutch disability insurance program. We find that discretion is...

This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands, using unique longitudinal administrative data from the social benefitadministration. We follow a difference-in-differences approach to identify the impact of changes in DI...

Public schemes for sickness benefits and disability insurance are often criticized for the lack of incentive they provide for preventive and reintegration activities by employers. To stimulate the interest of employers in engaging with these schemes, several modes of privatization could be...

Experience rated Disability Insurance (DI) premiums are often advocated as a means to stimulate firms to reduce DI inflow and increase DI outflow. To assess the size of these intended effects of experience rating, this study provides an empirical analysis of the effects of DI experience rating...

Many OECD countries are facing decreases in the employment rates of disabled workers. To uncover the driving forces of these trends, this paper estimates Age-Period- Cohort (APC) models on administrative data of Disability Insurance (DI) application cohorts for the Netherlands between 1999 and...

Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers' outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased...

Workers with fixed-term contracts typically have worse health than workers with permanent contracts. We show that these differences in health translate into a substantially higher (30%) risk of applying for disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands. Using unique administrative data on health...

While a large share of Disability Insurance recipients are expected to recover, outflow rates from temporary disability schemes are typically negligible. We estimate the disincentive effects of disability benefits on the response to a (mental) health improvement using administrative data on all...

This paper analyzes selection and incentive effects of opting out from public to private insurance on employer Disability Insurance (DI) inflow rates. We use administrative information on DI benefit costs and opting-out decisions of a balanced panel of about 140,000 employers that are observed...