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We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive- form games with unawareness … set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we … show that prudent rationalizability yields unraveling under full awareness but unraveling might fail under unawareness. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101418
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936493
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593900
We model firms’ quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently ….e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872103
We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently … that work under monopoly, i.e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197545
We study a game in which a sender with verifiable private information has to pay an access fee that is announced by a receiver to be able to convey her message to the receiver. The setting is motivated by the literature of pay-and-lobby politics, which finds that politicians decide to schedule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420219
We study a game in which a sender with verifiable private information has to pay an access fee that is announced by a receiver to be able to convey her message to the receiver. The setting is motivated by the literature of pay-and-lobby politics, which finds that politicians decide to schedule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358351
We model firms’ quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently … that work under monopoly, i.e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191460
We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently ….e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847547