Both, discussion and legislation in the field of corporate governance have been dominated by new institutional economics, especially agency theory. Due to its restrictive assumptions agency theory systematically disregards some important aspects that influence cooperative interaction between...

We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player...

Technological advancement, globalization and competition are changing the economic and social environment rapidly. As a result of this, organizations that are unable to urgently cope and adapt to these changes are underperforming because the factors for success in the past no longer holds. The...

This study empirically analyzes barriers preventing private investors from participating in the market of sustainable and responsible investments (SRI). Thereby, we link the strand of literature regarding participation costs of stockholding, i.e. information and transaction costs, to SRI market...

Vertrauen hat Konjunktur. Seit etlichen Jahren ist es en vogue, Vertrauen einzufordern. Politiker fordern das Vertrauen der Wähler und konstatieren konsterniert,dass sie das Vertrauen der Wähler verloren haben (Der Spiegel Nr. 26;2004: 24, Müntefering: Uns ist das Vertrauen der Menschen...

Die Neue Institutionenökonomik und insbesondere die Agency-Theorie habensich zum heute dominierenden Paradigma der Corporate Governance-Diskussionentwickelt. Aufgrund der restriktiven Modellannahmen, die diesem Ansatzzugrunde liegen, werden jedoch einige Effekte, die in der Realität von...