Following prospect theory we consider decision making under risk in which the decision maker''s preferences depend on a reference outcome. An outcome below this reference outcome is regarded as resulting from a loss: a loss decreases the decision maker''s basic utility more than a comparable...

Following prospect theory we consider decision making under risk in which the decision maker''s preferences depend on a reference outcome. An outcome below this reference outcome is regarded as resulting from a loss: a loss decreases the decision maker''s basic utility more than a comparable...

The scope for optimal international coordination of indirect taxes is examined in a macroeconomic game-theoretic framework which encompasses two regionally integrated economies, which have a single goods market. In each country there are tax-financed non-tradeable public goods, while labor is...

The purpose of this paper is to review and discuss the key improvements brought to OxGauss. Without having to install Gauss on his or her machine, the OxGauss user can run under Ox a wide range of Gauss programs and codes. Even with the console Ox version (free for academics), Gauss codes can...

This paper contributes to the econometric literature on structural breaks by proposing a test for parameter stability in VAR models at a particular frequency 'omega', where 'omega is an element of [0, pi]'.When a dynamic model is affected by a structural break, the new tests allow for detecting...

Several panel unit root tests that account for cross section dependence using a common factor structure have been proposed in the literature recently, notably Pesaran (2003), Moon and Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng (2004). This paper is aimed at comparing these three proposed unit root tests for...

Panel unit root and no-cointegration tests that rely on cross-sectional independence of the panel unit experience severe size distortions when this assumption is violated, as has e.g. been shown by Banerjee, Marcellino and Osbat (2004, 2005) via Monte Carlo simulations. Several studies have...

The scope for optimal international coordination of indirect taxes is examined in a macroeconomic game-theoretic framework which encompasses two regionally integrated economies, which have a single goods market. In each country there are tax-financed non-tradeable public goods, while labor is...

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of...

We combine two approaches to causal reasoning. Granger-causality, on the one hand, is popular in fields like econometrics, where randomised experiments are not very common. Instead information about the dynamic development of a system is explicitly modelled and used to define potentially causal...