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How to Tremble if you Must.
Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200425
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EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.
MAILATH, G.J.; SAMUELSON, L.; SWINKELS, J. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200450
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EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC GAMES.
SAMUELSON, L.; ZHANG, J. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200457
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Evolution and Endogenous Interations.
Mailath, G.J.; Samuelson, L.; Shaked, A. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795270
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DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE.
SAMUELSON, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795309
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Learning to Signal in Market.
Noldeka, G.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795310
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CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES.
FRIEDMAN, J.W.; SAMUELSON, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443501
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Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games.
Samuelson, L.; Zhang, J. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775430
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An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions.
Friedman, J.W.; Samuelson, L. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618620
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EVOLUTIONNARY STABILITY IN ASYMMETRIC GAMES.
SAMUELSON, L. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631441