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IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774091
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A SET-THEORETIC APPROACH TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES: PART 1.
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774099
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A definition of Perfect Baysian Equilibrium.
Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774121
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Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games.
Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005609648
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Extensive Forms and Set-Theoretic Forms.
Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005609655
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IF HE DOES NOT KNOW. WILL HE KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW?
BONANNO, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618204
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A Logical Representation of Extensive Games with Perfect Information.
Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474456
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Players' Information in Extensive Games.
Bonanno, G. - California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656829